Avoiding Scope Creep in Iraq

A lot of the debate about Iraq in this country has been between folks who feel we have to finish well there, versus those determined to make it into another Viet Nam, lately complete with references to the Tet offensive, and wanting us to leave immediately or at least soon.

It does seem to be human nature to continue refighting the last war. Thus, it is not surprising for my generation, raised during the Viet Nam war, to see everything through those lenses, just as it describes every political crisis by adding "Gate" to the end of its name.

However, we were lied to by the media about Viet Nam at the time, and some have not learned anything useful about that war since. Contrary to what we were told by Walter Cronkite, we won the Tet Offensive, according to no less an authority than the opposing general, Giap. Only the media war was lost, and that sadly seems similar to today when CNN knowingly airs propaganda films produced by our enemies.

However satisfying it is to chant "Out of Iraq Now", it might first be well to remember the millions in Southeast Asia who died shortly after our departure. If you dislike the current level of violence in Iraq, imagine the consequences of a full-blown civil war there.

We are now ourselves "The Man", and can no longer just moan and groan about public policy, as though it were being made by others. Like it or not, Boomers are now adults.

So I don't want to hear how you didn't want us to go to Iraq and how you want us out now unless you are also willing to say it's OK if millions of our supporters there die as a result, and also OK if our enemies there follow and attack us here instead. It's obvious both those results would follow any immediate departure by U.S. forces from Iraq.

That out of the way, there is another problem with our current efforts in Iraq that needs to be squarely faced - scope creep. A common problem in IT projects is that a project started to do one thing somehow morphs mid-stream into a much larger project to do something else, becoming late and over-budget in the process. That is also happening in Iraq.

We went there to get rid of Saddam Hussein, and we have done so. We did not go there to turn Iraq into a modern democracy, but some now consider that the goal, impossible though it is.

We need to be in Iraq, to keep a close eye on its troublesome neighborhood. But we do not need to micromanage anything there. So long as Iraq's new government doesn't shelter terrorists or attack Americans, why is it any business of ours how they run their country?

Similarly, we need to deter violence against our forces by people who hide among civilians. That isn't hard to do; it's only hard to do so without also harming civilians. But as previously mentioned here, the easiest way to keep our opponents from hiding among civilians is to not let that affect our response to attacks. If, for example, a sniper shoots from a building, the hard and dangerous way to respond is by searching the building room by room. The easy and safe way to respond is by leveling the building. If that were to happen, the media would still moan about civilian casualties, but no longer about dead American soldiers. And afterwards, civilians in other buildings would take very personal offense to future snipers.

Similarly, if Iraqis want to split their country into three internal federal zones (one each for Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis), why is that any concern of ours, even if the result doesn't leave Sunnis with any oil? I find it very difficult to oppose fair consequences for the group responsible for all the suffering of the Saddam years, and the Kurds have already proven themselves quite capable of self-rule in their region.

In summary, there are two ways to fail in Iraq: one by cutting and running, and the other via scope creep. To achieve our objectives in going there we must avoid both.